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Flexibility is central to delivering innovation but it needs to
be matched by accountability
Jane Mansour argues that the weaker than expected performance of US charter schools
raises important questions about the opening up of public sector provision in the UK. While
flexibility is central to delivering innovation, it must be matched by accountability. Removing
contracts from organizations which underperform should be seen as a strength of the
contract, rather than a weakness of the policy programme. 
In the US a signif icant proportion of  charter schools are delivering weaker than expected
perf ormance, with litt le consequence f or the contract holders. On 19th March Chris
Grayling, the UK Minister f or Employment, f aced the Department f or Work and Pensions (DWP) Select
Committee and underlined his commitment to culling f ailing Work Programme providers and transf erring
clients to their more successf ul competitors.
Proponents of  opening up public service provision of ten f ocus on the ability of  new organisations to
deliver innovation and drive up perf ormance. There are examples of  this happening – in the best cases
lessons learnt have been applied by providers f rom all sectors and improvement has been f elt across the
board. However, what happens when organisations brought in to raise perf ormance f ail to do so? Do
they f ace real consequences f or missing targets? Or are they protected by the very contract
procurement and management systems that should hold them accountable?
The American charter school model has been much discussed on both sides of  the Atlantic. Some charter
schools have improved educational outcomes f or their pupils, on occasions in remarkable ways.
However, it is currently the case that a third of  charter schools are perf orming worse than the public
schools they were set up to replace (and 47% demonstrate litt le dif f erence). The theory was that in
exchange f or taxpayer f unds and f lexibility to move beyond the tradit ional school f ormat, charters would
be highly accountable. Closing inef f ective schools was central to this theory. This accountability has
rarely appeared in practice.
“The issue of  quality is the most pressing problem that the charter school movement f aces,” said Dr.
Margaret Raymond, director of  CREDO at Stanf ord University, “… it needs to … f ocus on removing the
barriers to exit, which means closing underperf orming schools.”
In the 2010-2011 school year 6.2% of  charter schools did not have their contracts renewed – about a
f if th of  those that are underperf orming. This is down f rom 8.8% and 12.2% in the previous two years.
The declining closure rate is not indicative of  continually improving perf ormance – indeed Greg
Richmond, President and CEO of  the National Association of  Charter School Authorizers (NACSA),
suggests that a more appropriate annual rate of  closure f or f ailure to meet targets should be 15-20%.
The UK welf are to work market tells a similar story. There is a sense that there is no consequence f or
poor perf ormance. Contracts are rarely pulled, and previous perf ormance is not considered during
tendering processes. This has a de-motivating ef f ect on other providers, both prime and sub
contractors, as well as Jobcentre Plus managers in those Districts. It encourages lower standards with
contractors allowed to priorit ise bottom line perf ormance over service impact.
Part of  the problem is that it is not always as easy as it should be to comprehend how successf ul
introducing additional providers has been. Understanding how dif f erent providers (f rom public, private
and voluntary sectors) are perf orming is made dif f icult both by the inaccessibility and lack of
transparency of  much of  the required data and the measures selected f or analysis. There is no, or very
limited, comparable benchmarking.
This f orms a strong contrast with the Australian welf are to work star rating system, which compares
perf ormance of  providers using regression analysis to control f or exogenous f actors such as labour
market conditions and personal characteristics of  the jobseekers. On the back of  this evidence base,
good perf ormance can be rewarded with increased market share and contract renewal.
In the UK, comparative analysis f or those perf ormance league tables that are published is generally
simplistic. It is not designed to capture and analyse the complexity of  perf ormance. It plays no role in the
reassignment of  contracts or the award of  new ones. There are, of  course, issues with the validity of
classif ication but the importance of  examining, understanding and weighting the various f actors that
make up provider perf ormance is essential.
Private and voluntary sector providers delivering a variety of  public services have been given increasing
levels of  f reedom to deliver success. Flexibility is central to delivering innovation and with it, quality
perf ormance. This needs to be matched by accountability. Challenging and ult imately removing contracts
f rom those organisations that do not meet expectations is a sign of  the strength and sophistication of
the contract, rather than the weakness of  the programme or the polit ical policy. If  this holding to account
occurs within a context of  continuous improvement, clear measurement and transparent reporting then it
is the sign of  a healthy system.
There are a number of  steps that are essential to achieve accountability:
1. Improve perf ormance measurement – both quality and transparency;
2. Ensure quality inf ormation is given to bidders, and when mistakes are discovered in this inf ormation,
or the contact changes, allow reasonable amendments to agreed perf ormance targets;
3. Assess ability to deliver – previous perf ormance needs to f orm an important part of  the bid
assessment process. New entrants to the market can be scored dif f erently to ensure equity, though
should, anyway, be able to ref erence some sort of  relevant, quantif iable perf ormance;
4. Sit accountability at the heart of  all contracts – remove f ailing providers and support successf ul
models to expand, with operational contingencies in place to enable this.
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